Nibbana Sermon 25

"This is peaceful, this is excellent, namely the stilling of all prepa-rations, the relinquishment of all assets, the destruction of craving, detachment, cessation, extinction."

With the permission of the Most Venerable Great Preceptor and the assembly of the venerable meditative monks. This is the twenty-fifth sermon in the series of sermons on Nibbàna. The other day we made an attempt to understand, in the light of the Kàëakàràmasutta, the enlightened attitude of the Tathàgata, who has realized the cessation of the six bases of sense-contact, towards the view-points of the worldlings, who find themselves confined within those six bases.

In that discourse, the Buddha declared with the words tam ahaü jànà-mi, "[all] that do I know",2 the fact that he has understood all what the world with its gods, Màras and Brahmas, and the progeny consisting of recluses and Brahmins, gods and men, have seen, heard, sensed, cognized, thought after and pondered over by the mind.

By his next assertion tam ahaü abbha¤¤àsiü, the Buddha proclaimed that he not only knows all that, but knows it thoroughly in some special way. With the words taü tathàgatassa viditaü, he declares that by virtue of this special knowledge he has understood all what the world claims to know. Despite this special knowledge and understanding, the Tathàgata takes no stance and has no inclination or partiality towards those sensory data, as is evident from the expression taü tathàgato na upaññhàsi.

Worldings in general are in the habit of asserting dogmatically `I know, I see, it is verily so', jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,3 when they have a special knowledge or understanding of something or other. But according to this discourse, it seems that the Buddha takes no stance and has no inclination or partiality towards those sensory data, precisely because he has a special knowledge and understanding with regard to them. This fact is highlighted by the concluding summary verses, particularly by the lines:

Jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,
ajjhositaü n' atthi tathàgatànaü.

I know, I see, 'tis verily so. No such clinging for the Tathàgatas. In order to explain this strange difference of attitude, we quoted the other day two significant terms from the Målapariyàyasutta of the Majjhima-nikàya, namely sa¤jànàti and abhijànàti. They represent two levels of knowledge in the context of that particular discourse.

Sa¤jànàti stands for perceptual knowledge, whereas abhijànàti conveys the idea of some special understanding of a higher order. The level of knowledge implied by the term sa¤jànàti is that which characterizes the ordinary worldling's world view. He is deluded by the mirage-like perception in his view of the world and goes on imagining, ma¤¤anà, a real world enslaved to the patterns of the grammatical structure.
But the Tathàgata has penetrated into the true nature of those seens, heards, sensed and the like, with his extraordinary level of higher knowledge, abhi¤¤à, yielding full comprehension. Therefore, he does not take his stand upon any of them. He has no stance to justify the usage of the term upaññhàsi, since he does not entertain imaginings, ma¤¤anà.

What is called ma¤¤anà is the imagining in egoistic terms, imparting reality to illusory things. It is this principle of refraining from vain imaginings that is indicated by the term na upaññhàsi, "does not take his stand upon".

Tathàgatas have no clinging or entanglement, ajjhositaü, precisely because they entertain no imaginings. In regard to things seen, heard, etc. the Tathàgatas have no clinging, binding or entanglement by way of craving, conceit and views, respectively.
We happened to mention the other day that those peculiar declarations, with which the Kàëakàràmasutta opens, bear some resemblance to the tetralemma discussed in our treatment of the undetermined points.4

The set of four alternative propositions concerning the Tathàgata's after death state may be cited as a paradigm for the tetralemma.
1) Hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà,
"the Tathàgata exists after death";
2) na hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà,
"the Tathàgata does not exist after death";
3) hoti ca na ca hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà,
"the Tathàgata both exists and does not exist after death";
4) n'eva hoti na na hoti tathàgato paraü maraõà,
"the Tathàgata neither exists nor does not exist after death". 5

The declarations found in this discourse bear some affinity to the above-mentioned tetralemma. However, we find here the Buddha making the first declaration in several stages. Firstly, he makes the statement that whatever is seen, heard, sensed, and cognized, thought after and pondered over by all beings in the world, that he knows.

In the second statement he affirms that he has a higher knowledge of all that. Then comes a sentence which reaffirms that the Tathàgata has understood, but ends with the statement "the Tathàgata does not take his stand upon it".

Generally, when confronted with the tetralemma, the Buddha summarily dismisses all the four alternative propositions. But here the peculiarity is in not dismissing the first proposition at once. He declares that he knows, that he has a higher knowledge, and that he has understood all that.
Apparently he is affirming the first proposition, granting the validity of sensory data. But then comes the concluding statement to the effect that he does not take his stand upon them, na upaññhàsi, which amounts to a negation.

The secret behind this peculiar presentation will emerge when we bring up the proper similes and parables. Till then, what can be gleaned from the context is that the Tathàgata has no stance, not because he is ignorant, but due to the very fact that he knows full well and has understood the nature of the sum total of sensory data.

The worldlings are prone to think that it is when convincing knowledge is lacking that one has no such stance. But the Buddha declares here that he takes no stance in regard to what is seen, heard, sensed etc., precisely because he has a special understanding, a penetrative knowledge of the essence-lessness of the data obtained through the six sense-bases.

So it seems, in this context too, we have the negation of the first alternative, as is usual in the case of a tetralemma, only that the negation is expressed here in a very peculiar way. Let us now take up the second declaration.

Yaü, bhikkhave, sadevakassa lokassa samàrakassa sabrahmakassa sassamaõabràhmaõiyà pajàya sadevamanussàya diññhaü sutaü mutaü vi¤¤àtaü pattaü pariyesitaü anuvicaritaü manasà, tam ahaü `na jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa musà.

"If I were to say, monks, whatsoever in the world, with its gods, Màras and Brahmas, among the progeny consisting of recluses and Brahmins, gods and men, whatsoever is seen, heard, sensed, and cognized, thought after and pondered over by the mind, all that I do not know, it would be a falsehood in me."

There is a difference of opinion as to the correct reading of this second declaration. Deep Suttas often present difficulties in determining the exact reading, and this is especially the case with the Kàëakàràmasutta.

In this instance, the commentary has followed the reading tam ahaü `jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa musà, "if I were to say `that I know', it would be a falsehood in me". But as we have pointed out earlier, this reading is not meaningful.6 That is probably why the Chaññhasaïgãti-piñaka edition has followed the variant reading tam ahaü `na jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, "if I were to say `that I do not know'. This departure from the commentarial tradition seems justifiable, since the Buddha has already declared that he knows all that.

It stands to reason, therefore, that in the second declaration he makes it clear that to say `I do not know' would be a contradiction, a falsehood. But why this clarification?

Generally the worldlings expect one to unequivocally assert and take one's stand upon one's viewpoint in categorical terms, as expressed by the dictum idam eva saccaü, mogham a¤¤aü, "this alone is true, all else is false".7 Failure to do so is recognized as a lack of knowledge or precision. The second declaration is meant to forestall such an objection, since the first declaration ends with the clause taü tathàgato na upaññhàsi, but "the Tathàgata has not taken his stand upon it". So it amounts to a statement like `it is not because I do not know that I take no stance'. In the same strain, we can explain the declarations that follow.

It seems, then, that the second declaration tam ahaü `na jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa musà, "if I were to say, `all that I do not know', it would be a falsehood in me", amounts to the second alternative of the tetralemma.

The next declaration follows the same trend. To quote the relevant portion, tam ahaü `jànàmi ca na ca jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü p' assa tàdisam eva, "if I were to say `I both know it and do not know it', that too would be a falsehood in me".

In regard to the aforesaid seens, heards, sensed etc., if I were to say that I know, I do not know, or even a combination of both those statements as `I both know and do not know', it would be a falsehood on my part. Why? Because the world is accustomed to put down such a vacillation to a lack of certitude. To say `I both know it and know it not' looks like a confession of partial knowledge, since it can mean knowledge and ignorance going fifty-fifty. So the Buddha says, in this instance, too, that it would likewise be a falsehood, taü p' assa tàdisam eva.

Now we come to the fourth statement. The Buddha declares, "if I were to say `I neither know it, nor am ignorant of it', it would be a fault in me", tam ahaü `neva jànàmi na na jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa kali.

We can understand that position, too. Generally the worldlings think that a refusal to make a categorical statement is either due to partial knowledge, or to an attitude of wriggling out. In fact, this attitude of wriggling out had already assumed the status of a philosophy in itself in Sa¤jaya Belaññhiputta, a contemporary of the Buddha.

When he was interrogated, he would respond with such a series of negations like "I do not say it is, I do not say it is thus, I do not say it is otherwise, nor do I say it is neither", etc.8 The attempt here is to evade the issue by a sort of `eel-wriggling'. That school of philosophy, which resorted to such an evasive legerdemain, came to be known as amarà-vikkhepa-vàda. The Buddha refuses to subscribe to such tactical sophistry by rejecting the fourth alternative `I neither know it, nor am ignorant of it'.

Here, then, we have the same tetralemma, presented in a different guise. It smacks of a riddle that the Buddha was confronted with - the riddle of coming to terms with worldly parlance. As we have already mentioned, the commentary analyses the main theme of the discourse into five planes. It also records that the earth shook at five points of the discourse, that is, at the end of the proclamation for each plane.9

According to the commentary, the first plane is the plane of om-niscience, sabba¤¤utabhåmi. The phrases representative of that plane are said to be tam ahaü jànàmi, "that I know", tam aham abbha¤¤àsiü, "that have I fully understood", and taü tathàgatassa viditaü, "that is known to the Tathàgata".

Then comes the plane of the influx-free one, khãõàsavabhåmi, rep-resented by the section ending with the phrase na upaññhàsi, "does not take his stand upon it". It is so called because that phrase brings out the characteristic of not taking a stance by way of cravings, conceits and views in the case of an influx-free one.

The three phrases taü mama assa musà, "it would be a falsehood on my part", taü p' assa tàdisam eva, "likewise, that too would be a falsehood in me", and taü mama assa kali, "it would be a fault in me", are interpreted by the commentary as representing the third plane of truth, saccabhåmi. We have now dealt with that, too.

What comes next as the fourth plane is the deepest of all. The commentary calls it the plane of the void, su¤¤atàbhåmi. It is with good reason that it is so called. The paragraph that follows is said to represent that plane; it runs:

Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati, adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati, daññhabbaü na ma¤¤ati, daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati. Sutà sotabbaü sutaü na ma¤¤ati, asutaü na ma¤¤ati, sotabbaü na ma¤¤ati, sotàraü na ma¤¤ati. Mutà motabbaü mutaü na ma¤¤ati, amutaü na ma¤¤ati, motabbaü na ma¤¤ati, motàraü na ma¤¤ati. Vi¤¤àtà vi¤¤àtabbaü vi¤¤àtaü na ma¤¤ati, avi¤¤àtaü na ma¤¤ati, vi¤¤àtabbaü na ma¤¤ati, vi¤¤àtàraü na ma¤¤ati.

Here, too, we are confronted with the question of variant readings. To begin with, here we have given the phrase diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü, whereas the commentary takes it as daññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü. According to the commentary, daññhà is a hypothetical variant of the absolutive form disvà, for it paraphrases `daññhà daññhabban' ti disvà daññhabbaü,10 that is, "daññhà daññhabbaü stands for disvà daññhabbaü. So the whole sentence in question is said to convey the sense "having seen, he does not imagine a seen worth seeing". But the variant reading diññha is granted, though the commentator prefers the reading daññha as it is suggestive of an absolutive dçùñvà.

Taking the cue from this commentarial preference, the Burmese Chaññhasaïgãti edition goes a step further in substituting sutvà, mutvà and vi¤¤atvà rather arbitrarily to give an absolutive twist to the three phrases that follow as sutvà sotabbaü sutaü, mutvà motabbaü mutaü, and vi¤¤atvà vi¤¤àtabbaü vi¤¤àtaü. Probably the editors thought that in this context the terms diññha suta muta and vi¤¤àta could not be interpreted as they are.
But we may point out that, in keeping with the line of interpretation we have followed so far, these three terms may be said to stand for an extremely deep dimension of this discourse, dealing with the void. The other day we simply gave a sketch of a possible rendering.

The statement diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati has to be interpreted as an assertion that the Tathàgata "does not imagine a sight worthwhile seeing as apart from the seen", that there is nothing substantial in the seen. So also the other statements, sutà sotabbaü sutaü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a worthwhile hearing apart from the heard"; mutà motabbaü mutaü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a worthwhile sensing apart from the sensed"; vi¤¤àtà vi¤¤àtabbaü vi¤¤àtaü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a worthwhile cognition apart from the cognized".

In case our interpretation still appears problematic, we may hark back to the Bàhiyasutta we have already explained at length.11 The philosophy behind the Buddha's exhortation to the ascetic Bàhiya could be summed up in the words diññhe diññhamattaü bhavissati, sute sutamattaü bhavissati, mute mutamattaü bhavissati, vi¤¤àte vi¤¤àtamattaü bhavissati,12 "in the seen there will be just the seen, in the heard there will be just the heard, in the sensed there will be just the sensed, in the cognized there will be just the cognized".

What is meant is that one has to stop at just the seen, without dis-cursively imagining that there is some-`thing' seen, some-`thing' substantial behind the seen. Similarly in regard to the heard, one has to take it as just a heard, not some-`thing' heard.

In the case of the phrase diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati the word diññhà, being in the ablative case, we may render it as "does not imagine a sight worthwhile seeing `as apart from' the seen". By way of further clarification of this point, we may revert to the simile of the dog on the plank, which we gave in our explanation of nàma-råpa.13 The simile, of course, is not canonical, but of fable origin.

When a dog, while crossing a stream, stops halfway on the plank and starts wagging its tail and peeping curiously down, the reason is the sight of its own image in the water. It imagines a dog there, a `water-dog'. The dog thinks that there is something worthwhile seeing, apart from the seen.
It is unaware of the fact that it is seeing what it sees because it is looking. It thinks that it is looking because there is something out there to be seen. The moment it realizes that it is seeing because it is looking, it will stop looking at its own image in the water.

We have here a very subtle point in the law of dependent arising, one that is integral to the analysis of name-and-form. So, then, due to the very ignorance of the fact that it is seeing because it is looking, the dog imagines another dog, there, in the water. What is called ma¤¤anà is an imagining of that sort.

No such imagining is there in the Tathàgata, diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati, "he does not imagine a sight worth seeing as apart from the seen". In short, for him the seen is the be all and the end all of it.

The seen is dependently arisen. It comes about due to a collocation of conditions, apart from which it has no existence per se. Every instance of looking down at the water is a fresh experience and every time an image of the dog in the water and of another looking at it is created. The dog is seeing its own image. Everything is dependently arisen, phassapaccayà, says the Brahmajàla-sutta, "dependent on contact".14

Here there is something really deep. It is because of the personality-view, sakkàyadiññhi, that the world is carried away by this illusion. One goes on looking saying that one is doing so as there is something to be seen. But the seen is there because of the looking.

This, then, is the moral behind the statement diññhà daññhabbaü diñ-ñhaü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a seen worthwhile seeing as apart from the seen itself". This is the dictum implicit in the Bàhiya-sutta, too, which could be illustrated by the simile of the dog on the plank. The Tathàgata does not imagine a sight as existing apart from the bare act of seeing.

If further illustrations are needed, let us take the case of hearing music from a distance. One imagines a thing called `music' and with the idea of listening to the same music goes to the place where the music is going on. One is not aware of the fact that at each step in that direction one is hearing a different music. Why? Because one is ignorant of the law of dependent arising. Just as in the former case the dog seen is dependent on the dog looking, here too, the auditory consciousness of a music is the outcome of a dependence between ear and sound.

So, deluded as he is, he goes to the music hall to listen better to the same music. He will realize the extent of his delusion if he happens to put his ear to the musical instrument. When he does so, he will hear not a music, but a set of crude vibrations. But this is what is going on in the world. The world is steeped in the delusion of imagining that it is the same music one is hearing, though at each step in that direction the music changes. This is due to the fact that it is dependently arisen. Actually, there is no person hearing, but only a state of affairs dependent on the ear and sound, a conditioned arising dependent on contact. In the present textual context, the terms diññha suta muta and vi¤¤àta, seen, heard, sensed and cognized, have to be understood in this light.

So this is how the phrase diññhà daññhabbaü diññhaü na ma¤¤ati has to be interpreted. But the commentary does not seem to have appreciated the relevance of this paragraph to the Buddha's teachings on voidness. While commenting on diññhaü na ma¤¤ati it expatiates `ahaü mahàjanena diññhameva passàmã'ti taõhàmànadiññhãhi na ma¤¤ati. According to it, what is meant is that the Tathàgata does not imagine by way of cravings, conceits and views that he is seeing just what the common people have seen. This is an oversimplification, a rather shallow interpretation.

The next phrase, adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati, is similarly explained, `a-diññhaü na ma¤¤atã'ti `ahaü mahàjanena adiññhameva etaü passàmã' ti evampi taõhàdihi ma¤¤anàhi na ma¤¤ati, "he does not imagine an unseen" means that the Tathàgata does not imagine by way of imaginings through craving etc. that he is seeing something unseen by the common people. The commentary, it seems, has gone at a tangent, bypassing the deeper sense.
We have already explained the deeper significance of the phrase, diñ-ñhaü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a seen". Now what does adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati mean?

In terms of our simile of the dog on the plank, diññhaü na ma¤¤ati means that the Tathàgata does not imagine a dog in the water. Adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati could therefore mean that the Tathàgata does not imagine that the dog has not seen. Why he does not treat it as an unseen should be clear from that declaration we had already cited, ending with tam ahaü `na jànàmã'ti vadeyyaü, taü mama assa musà, "if I were to say `that I do not know', it would be a falsehood in me".

The fact of seeing is not denied, though what is seen is not taken as a dog, but only as an image of one, that is dependently arisen. Since the understanding of it as a dependently arisen phenomenon is there, the Tathàgata does not imagine an unseen either, adiññhaü na ma¤¤ati.
The phrase daññhabbaü na ma¤¤ati, is also explicable in the light of the foregoing discussion. Now, the dog on the plank keeps on looking down at the water again and again because it thinks that there is something worthwhile seeing in the water. Such a delusion is not there in the Tathàgata. He knows that at each turn it is a phenomenon of a seen dependently arisen, dependent on contact, phassapaccayà.

Every time it happens, it is a fresh sight, a new preparation, saïkhàra. So there is nothing to look for in it. Only a looking is there, nothing worth looking at. Only a seeing is there, nothing to be seen. Apart from the bare act of hearing, there is nothing to be heard. It is the wrong view of a self that gives a notion of substantiality. The above phrase, therefore, is suggestive of insubstantiality, essencelessness, and voidness.

Music is just a word. By taking seriously the concept behind that word, one imagines a thing called `music'. The pandemonium created by a number of musical instruments is subsumed under the word `music'. Then one goes all the way to listen to it. The same state of affairs prevails in the case of the seen. It is because the Tathàgata has understood this fact that he does not imagine a thing worth seeing or hearing. The same applies to the other sensory data.

Then comes the phrase daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a seer". Here we have the direct expression of voidness - the voidness of a self or anything belonging to a self. Now that dog on the plank has not understood the fact that there is a mutual relationship between the looking dog and the seen dog. It is because of the looking dog that the seen dog is seen. There is a conditioned relationship between the two.

In other words, dependent on eye and forms arises eye-consciousness, cakkhu¤ca pañicca råpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi¤¤àõaü.15 The mere presence of the eye is not enough for eye consciousness to arise, but dependent on eye and forms, arises eye-consciousness.

Though stated simply, it has a depth that is not easy to fathom. To say that it is dependent on eye and form is to admit that it is dependently arisen. The law of dependent arising is already implicated. There is therefore no seer, apart from the phenomenon of seeing, according to the Tathàgata. He does not imagine a seer, daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati. For the worldling, the bare act of seeing carries with it a perception of `one who sees'. He has a notion of a self and something belonging to a self.

The same teaching is found in the Bàhiya-sutta. After instructing Bàhiya to stop at just the seen, the heard, the sensed and the cognized, the Buddha goes on to outline the end result of that training.

Yato kho te, Bàhiya, diññhe diññhamattaü bhavissati, sute sutamattaü bhavissati, mute mutamattaü bhavissati, vi¤¤àte vi¤¤àtamattaü bhavissati, tato tvaü Bàhiya na tena. Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tena, tato tvaü Bàhiya na tattha. Yato tvaü Bàhiya na tattha, tato tvaü Bàhiya nev' idha na huraü na ubhayamantarena. Es' ev' anto dukkhassa.16

"And when to you, Bàhiya, there will be in the seen just the seen, in the heard just the heard, in the sensed just the sensed, in the cognized just the cognized, then, Bàhiya, you are not by it. And when, Bàhiya, you are not by it, then, Bàhiya, you are not in it. And when, Bàhiya, you are not in it, then, Bàhiya, you are neither here nor there nor in between. This, itself, is the end of suffering."

That is to say, when, Bàhiya, you have gone through that training of stopping at just the seen, the heard, the sensed and the cognized, then you would not be imagining in terms of them. The algebraic - like expressions na tena and na tattha have to be understood as forms of egoistic imagining, ma¤¤anà.

When you do not imagine in terms of them, you would not be in them. There would be no involvement in regard to them. In the case of that music, for instance, you would not be in the orchestra. The egoistic imagining, implicating involvement with the music, presupposes a hearer, sotaraü, dwelling in the orchestra.

When, Bàhiya, you do not dwell in it, yato tvaü Bàhiya na tattha, then, Bàhiya, you are neither here, nor there, nor in between the two, tato tvaü Bàhiya nev' idha na huraü na ubhayamantarena. This itself is the end of suffering. In other words, you would have realized voidness, su¤¤atà.
The expressions daññhàraü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a seer"; sotàraü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a hearer"; motàraü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a sensor"; and vi¤¤àtàraü na ma¤¤ati, "does not imagine a knower", have to be understood in this light. The Tathàgata does not even imagine a thinker apart from thought. This is the plane of the void, su¤¤atàbhåmi, the perfect realization of the corelessness or essencelessness of the seen, the heard, the sensed and the cognized.

The very absence of ma¤¤anà, or "egoistic imagining", is to be understood by su¤¤atàbhåmi, or "the plane of the void". The worldling takes seriously the subject-object relationship in the grammatical structure, as it seems the simplest explanation of phenomena. Because there is something to be seen, there is someone who sees. Because there is someone who sees, there is something to be seen.

There is a duality between these two. To understand the law of de-pendent arising is to be free from this duality. It is the ability to see a concatenation of conditions, a conglomeration of causal factors - an assemblage instead of a bifurcation.

The way of the worldlings, however, is to follow the subject-object relationship, a naive acceptance of the grammatical structure, which is the easiest mode of communication of ideas. They are misled by it to take seriously such notions as `one who sees' and a `thing seen', `one who hears' and a `thing heard', but the Tathàgata is free from that delusion. Now we come to the fifth section of the discourse, known as tàdibhåmi, the "plane of the such". It runs:

Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññha-suta-muta-vi¤¤àtabbesu dham-mesu tàdã yeva tàdã, tamhà ca pana tàdimhà a¤¤o tàdã uttaritaro và paõãtataro và n' atthã'ti vadàmi.

"Thus, monks, the Tathàgata, being such in regard to all phenomena, seen, heard, sensed and cognized, is such. Moreover than he who is such there is none other higher or more excellent, I declare."

The most difficult word, here, is tàdã. We have already explained it to some extent. It can be rendered by "such" or "thus". The commentary explains it by the phrase tàdità nàma ekasadisatà,17 "suchness means to be always alike".

By way of illustration, the commentary states Tathàgato ca yàdiso làbhàdãsu, tàdisova alàbhàdãsu, "as he is in regard to gain etc., so is the Tathàgata in regard to loss etc.". The allusion here is to the eight worldly vicissitudes, gain/loss, fame/ill-fame, praise/blame, and pleasure/pain.18
But this explanation is rather misleading, as it ignores a certain deep dimension of the meaning of the term tàdã. When it is said "as he is in regard to gain, so is he in regard to loss", one can ask: `how is he in regard to gain?' This is imprecise as a meaning.

However, the commentator happens to quote from the Mahàniddesa another explanation, which is more to the point. It is briefly stated as iññhàniññhe tàdã, "such in regard to the desirable and the undesirable"; and explained as làbhepi tàdã, alàbhepi tàdã, yasepi tàdã,19 ayasepi tàdã, nindàyapi tàdã, pasaüsàyapi tàdã, sukhepi tàdã, dukkhepi tàdã, "he is such in gain as well as in loss, he is such in fame as well as in ill-fame ..." etc. That is the correct explanation. Instead of saying "as he is in gain, so is he in loss", we have here a continuous suchness in regard to all vicissitudes. He is such in gain as well as in loss, he is such in fame as well as in ill-fame, he is such in praise as well as in blame, he is such in pleasure as well as in pain.
The reason for this suchness we have explained on an earlier oc-casion.20 In one sense, the term tàdã stands for the understanding of the norm called tathatà. The other implication is the abstinence from the tendency towards identification or acquisition, meant by tammayatà. This exemplary trait is called atammayatà. This is an extremely important term, occurring in the discourses, which, however, has fallen into neglect at present.

In the case of music, for instance, tammayatà would imply an at-tachment to it that amounts to an identification with it. Tammayo means "made of that", as in suvaõõamaya, "made of gold", and rajatamaya, "made of silver". To be free from this tammayatà, is to be tàdã, "such", that is to say, not to be of that stuff, atammayatà. The attitude of not leaning on or grasping is meant by it.

The quality of being tàdã, or "such", is often rendered by "firmness", "steadfastness", and "immovability". Generally, one associates firmness, immovability or stability with holding on or leaning on. But here we have just the contrary. Not to hold on to anything, is to be `such'. This suchness has a flexibility of a higher order, or an adaptability. The adaptability characteristic of the sage who lives on piõóapàta, or alms-food, is highlighted in the following verse:

Alatthaü yadidaü sàdhu,
nàlatthaü kusalàm iti,
ubhayeneva so tàdã,
rukkhaü va upanivattati.21
"Suppose I got it, well and good,
Suppose I didn't get, that's fine too,
In both circumstances he is such,
And comes back [like one who walks up to a] tree."

This kind of adaptability and resilience is also implied by the term tàdã. Though the term is sometimes rendered by the word "steadfast", it does not stand for any rigidity. Instead, it carries implications of a non-rigid resilience.

This is a wonderful quality in Tathàgatas and arahants. We may compare it to a revolving swing in a children's playground. One who is seated in a revolving swing has nothing to get upset about falling headlong when the swing goes up. The seats are hung in such a way that they also turn with the revolving motion of the swing. Had they been rigidly fixed, one seated there would fall off the seat when it goes up. It is that kind of resilience that is characteristic of the quality of tàdità, or "suchness". This is how we have to understand the famous lines in the Mahàmaïgalasutta.

Phuññhassa lokadhammehi,
cittam yassa na kampati,22
"Whose mind remains unshaken,
When touched by worldly vicissitudes."

This quality of being unshaken, this immovability, is the result of not grasping. It comes when there is no tenacious clinging. It is to one who rests on or leans on something that there is dislodgement or instability.

Now I am leaning on the wall, if someone does damage to the wall, I would get shaken.That is what is suggested by the axiom nissitassa calitaü, anissitassa calitaü n'atthi, "to one who is attached, there is dislodgement, to the one detached, there is no dislodgement".23 The worldling, on the other hand, thinks that to lean on or to rely on something is the mark of stability.

So it seems that the term tàdã has an extraordinary dimension of meaning. In this particular context, however, the suchness spoken of does not concern the eight worldly vicissitudes like gain and loss. Here it carries a special nuance as is evident from the statement:

Iti kho, bhikkhave, tathàgato diññha-suta-muta-vi¤¤àtabbesu dham-mesu tàdã yeva tàdã. "Thus, monks, the Tathàgata, being such in regard to all phenomena, seen, heard, sensed and cognized, is such."

The suchness here meant is about the views adhered to by the worldlings. In regard to things seen, heard, sensed and cognized, the worldlings go on asserting dogmatically idam eva saccaü, mogham a¤¤aü, "this alone is true, all else is false". But the Tathàgata has no such dogmatic involvement. He only analytically exposes them for what they are.

As we tried to illustrate by the simile of the dog on the plank, the Tathàgata simply penetrates into their dependently arisen nature and declares that all those views are dependent on contact, phassapaccayà. That is the tàdã quality meant here. If we are to understand the plane of suchness, tàdãbhåmi, in a deeper sense, this is how we have to appreciate its significance. Now we come to the couplet forming the grand finale to the Kàëakàràmasutta.
Yaü ki¤ci diññhaü va sutaü mutaü và,
ajjhositaü saccamutaü paresaü,
na tesu tàdã sayasaüvutesu,
saccaü musà và pi paraü daheyyaü.
Eta¤ca sallaü pañigacca disvà,
ajjhosità yattha pajà visattà,
jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,
ajjhositaü n' atthi tathàgatànaü.

In the first verse, we have the difficult term sayasaüvutesu, which we rendered by "amidst those who are entrenched in their own views". The term carries insinuations of philosophical in-breeding, which often accounts for dogmatic adherence to views. The Tathàgata declares that he does not hold as true or false any of the concepts of individual truths based on what is seen, heard, sensed and cognized by others, because of his suchness. Being such, he does not categorically label any of those views as true or false. He penetrates into and analyses the psychological back-ground of all those dogmatic views and understands them as such.

In the final verse, he declares that he has seen well in advance "the barb on which mankind is hooked impaled". The barb is none other than the dogmatic assertion, `I know, I see, it is verily so'. Having seen this barb, well in advance, the Tathàgata entertains no dogmatic involvement of that sort.

The precise meaning of some words and phrases here is a matter of controversy. A discussion of them might throw more light on their deeper nuances. The most difficult term seems to be sayasaüvuta. The commen-tary gives the following explanation:

`Sayasaüvutesu'ti `sayameva saüvaritvà piyàyitvà gahitagahaõesu diññhigatikeså'ti attho. Diññhigatikà hi `sayaü saüvutà'ti vuccanti.24 "Sayasaüvutesu means among those dogmatic view-holders, who have grasped those views, having recollected them and cherished them. Dogmatic view-holders are called sayasaüvuta."

According to the commentary, the term sayasaüvuta refers to persons who hold dogmatic views. But we interpreted it as a reference to such views themselves.

By way of clarification, we may allude to some discourses in the Aññhakavagga of the Suttanipàta, which bring up a wealth of material to substantiate the salient points in the Kàëakàràmasutta, while throwing more light on the particular term in question. The chapter called Aññhakavagga in the Suttanipàta in particular embodies a deep analysis of the controversies among contemporary dogmatists.

Let us, first of all, take up for comment some verses that throw more light on the meaning of the term sayasaüvuta from the Cåëaviyåhasutta. That discourse unfolds itself in the form of question and answer. The commentary explains, that this medium of dialogue was adopted by the Buddha to resolve the clash of philosophical moot points current in the society, and that the interlocutor is a replica of the Buddha himself, created by his psychic power.25 Be that as it may, the relevant question for the present context is presented as follows.

Kasmà nu saccàni vadanti nànà,
pavàdiyàse kusalà vadànà,
saccàni su tàni bahåni nànà,
udàhu te takkam anussaranti.26
"Why do they proclaim various truths,
Claiming to be experts each in his field,
Are there several and various truths,
Or do they merely follow logical consistency?"
The Buddha's reply to it is as follows.
Na h'eva saccàni bahåni nànà,
a¤¤atra sa¤¤àya niccàni loke,
takka¤ ca diññhãsu pakappayitvà,
`saccaü musà 'ti dvayadhammam àhu.
"There are no several and various truths,
That are permanent in the world, apart from perception,
It is by manipulating logic in speculative views,
That they speak of two things called `truth and falsehood'."

There is no plurality in the concept of truth, apart from the perception based on which they declare various speculative views. It seems that the Buddha grants the possibility of various levels of perception as a truth for all times, though he does not accept a plurality of truths, arising out of a variety of speculative views based on them.

He understands the psychology of logic, having seen penetratively the perceptual background of each and every view. He accepts as a psychological fact that such and such a perception could precipitate such and such a view. Therefore, in a limited or relative sense, they are `true'.
The dichotomy between truth and falsehood has arisen in the world due to a manipulation of logic on individual viewpoints. This fact comes up for further comment in the Mahàviyåhasutta that follows.

Sakaü hi dhammaü paripuõõam àhu,
a¤¤asssa dhammaü pana hãnaü àhu,
evam pi viggayha vivàdiyanti,
sakaü sakaü sammutim àhu sacaü.27

This verse describes how debating parties go on clashing with each other. They call their own system of thought perfect, and the other system of thought inferior. Thus they quarrel and dispute. Their own individual viewpoint they assert as true. The phrase sakaü sakaü sammutim, "each his own viewpoint", is somewhat suggestive of sayasaüvutesu, the problematic term in the Kàëakàràmasutta.

Yet another verse from the Pasårasutta in the Aññhakavagga exposes the biases and prejudices underlying these individual truths.
`Idh' eva suddhi' iti vàdiyanti,
nà¤¤esu dhammesu visuddhim àhu,
yaü nissità tattha subhaü vadànà,
paccekasaccesu puthå niviññhà.28

"`Here in this system is purity', they assert polemically,
They are not prepared to grant purity in other systems of thought,
Whatever view they lean on, that they speak in praise of,
They are severally entrenched in their own individual truths."

The last line is particularly relevant, as it brings up the concept of pac-cekasacca. To be a Paccekabuddha means to be enlightened for oneself. So the term paccekasacca can mean "truth for oneself". Those who hold conflicting views go on debating entrenched each in his own concept of truth.
The three expressions pacekasacca, sakaü sakaü sammutim and sayasaüvutesu convey more or less the same idea. The words tesu saya-saüvutesu refer to those narrow viewpoints to which they are individually confined, or remain closeted in. The Tathàgata does not hold as true or false any of those views limited by the self-bias.

Another lapse in the commentary to the Kàëakàràmasutta is its com-ment on the phrase paraü daheyyaü. It takes the word paraü in the sense of "supreme", uttamaü katvà, whereas in this context it means "the other". Here, too, we may count on the following two lines of the Cåëa-viyåhasutta of the Suttanipàta in support of our interpretation.
Yen' eva `bàlo 'ti paraü dahàti,
tenàtumànaü `kusalo 'ti càha.29
"That by which one dubs the other a fool,
By that itself one calls oneself an expert".

From this it is clear that the phrase paraü dahàti means "dubs another". The last two lines of the Kàëakàràmasutta are of utmost impor-tance.
Jànàmi passàmi tath' eva etaü,
ajjhositaü n' atthi tathàgatànaü.
"I know I see, it is verily so,
No such clinging for the Tathàgatas."

Worldlings dogmatically grasp the data heaped up by their six sense-bases, but the Tathàgatas have no such entanglements in regard to sensory knowledge. Why so? It is because they have seen the cessation of the six sense-bases.

By way of illustration, we may compare this seeing of the cessation of the six sense-bases to an exposure of the inner mechanism of a high-speed engine by removing the bonnet. In the Dvayamsutta, from which we quoted in our last sermon, the Buddha showed us the functioning of the gigantic machine called the six-fold sense-base, its vibrations, revolutions, beats and running gears. The discourse analyses the mechanism in such words as.

Cakkhu aniccaü vipariõàmi a¤¤athàbhàvi. Råpà aniccà vipari-õàmino a¤¤athàbhàvino. Itthetaü dvayaü cala¤ceva vyaya¤ca aniccaü vipariõàmi a¤¤athàbhàvi.30

"Eye is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Thus this dyad is unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise."

The discourse proceeds in this vein and concludes with the words:
Phuññho, bhikkhave, vedeti, phuññho ceteti, phuññho sa¤jànàti. Itthete pi dhammà calà ceva vayà ca aniccà vipariõàmino a¤¤athàbhàvino.
"Contacted, monks, one feels, contacted one intends, contacted one perceives. Thus these things, too, are unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing and becoming otherwise."

The concluding reference is to the products of the six sense-bases. Feelings, intentions and perceptions, arising due to contact, are also unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing and becoming otherwise.

The sum total of percepts is indicated by the words diññha suta muta and vi¤¤àta. The totality of percepts are made up or `prepared', saïkhata. The term saïkhata has nuances suggestive of `production'. If we take the six-fold sense-base as a high-speed machine, productive of perceptions, the Buddha has revealed to us the workings of its intricate machinery. Each and every part of this machine is unstable, evanescent, impermanent, changing and becoming otherwise.

The Buddha understood the made up or prepared nature, saïkhata, of all these, as well as the preparations, saïkhàrà, that go into it. That is why the Buddha has no dogmatic involvement in regard to the products of this machine, the totality of all what is seen, heard, sensed and cognized, diññha suta muta vi¤¤àta. None of them is substantial. They are essenceless and insubstantial. There is nothing worthwhile grasping here as apart from the activities or preparations that are dynamic in themselves.

So far we have tried to understand the state of affairs with reference to this discourse. But now let us take up a canonical simile that facilitates our understanding. The Buddha has compared consciousness to a magic show in the Pheõapiõóåpamasutta of the Khandhasaüyutta we had already cited.31

Pheõapiõóåpamaü råpaü,
vedanà bubbuëåpamà,
marãcikåpamà sa¤¤à,
saïkhàrà kadalåpamà,
màyåpama¤ca vi¤¤àõaü,
dãpitàdiccabandhunà.
"Form is like a mass of foam,
And feeling but an airy bubble,
Perception is like a mirage,
And formations a banana trunk,
Consciousness is a magic show [a juggler's trick entire],
[All these similes] were made known by the kinsman of the sun."

As a matter of fact, the verse itself is a mnemonic summary of a certain sermon delivered by the Buddha. According to it, the Buddha, the kinsman of the sun, has compared form to a mass of foam, feeling to a water bubble, perception to a mirage, preparations to a banana trunk, and consciousness to a magic show.

What is of relevance to us here is the comparison of consciousness to a magic show. The simile of the magic show is presented in that Sutta in the following words:

Seyyathàpi, bhikkhave, màyàkàro và màyàkàrantevàsã và càtum-mahàpathe màyaü vidaüseyya. Tam enaü cakkhumà puriso passeyya nijjhàyeyya yoniso upaparikkheyya. Tassa taü passato nijjhàyato yoniso upaparikkhato rittaka¤¤eva khàyeyya tucchaka¤¤eva khàyeyya asàraka¤¤eva khàyeyya. Ki¤hi siyà, bhikkhave, màyàya sàro?

Evam eva kho, bhikkhave, yaü ki¤ci vi¤¤àõaü atãtànàgatapac-cuppannaü, ajjhattaü và bahiddhà và, oëàrikaü và sukhumaü và, hãnaü và paõãtaü và, yaü dåre santike và, taü bhikkhu passati nijjhàyati yoniso upaparikkhati. Tassa taü passato nijjhàyato yoniso upaparikkhato rittaka¤¤eva khàyati tucchaka¤¤eva khàyati asàraka¤¤eva khàyati. Ki¤hi siyà, bhikkhave, vi¤¤àõe sàro?

"Suppose, monks, a magician or a magician's apprentice should hold a magic show at the four cross-roads and a keen-sighted man should see it, ponder over it and reflect on it radically. Even as he sees it, ponders over it and reflects on it radically, he would find it empty, he would find it hollow, he would find it void of essence. What essence, monks, could there be in a magic show?
Even so, monks, whatever consciousness, be it past, future or present,

1. M I 436, MahàMàlunkyasutta.
2. A II 25, Kàëakàràmasutta.
3. Sn 908, MahàViyåhasutta.
4. See esp. sermon 20.
5. E.g. at M I 484, Aggivacchagottasutta.
6. See sermon 24.
7. E.g. at M I 484, Aggivacchagottasutta.
8. D I 58, Sàma¤¤aphalasutta.
9. Mp III 38.
10. Mp III 39.
11. See sermon 15.
12. Ud 8, Bàhiyasutta.
13. See sermon 6.
14. D I 42, Brahmajàlasutta.
15. E.g. M I 111, Madhupiõóikasutta.
16. Ud 8, Bàhiyasutta.
17. Mp III 40.
18. A IV 157, Pañhamalokadhammasutta.
19. Nid II 459.
20. See sermon 21.
21. Sn 712, Nàlakasutta.
22. Sn 268, Mahàmaïgalasutta.
23. Ud 81, Catutthanibbànapañisaüyuttasutta.
24. Mp III 41.
25. Pj II 554
26. Sn 885, CåëaViyåhasutta.
27. Sn 905, MahàViyåhasutta.
28. Sn 824, Pasårasutta.
29. Sn 888, CåëaViyåhasutta.
30. S IV 67, Dutiyadvayamsutta.
31. S III 142, Pheõapiõóåpamasutta, see sermon 11

Nibbàna Sermon 25